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but those cases can be considered as precedent for that proposition only.
The amendment which was the subject of the litigation in State vs. Swift 39
was re-submitted at a special election in 1881, and was ratified by an affirma-
tive vote smaller than the negative vote had been at the general election the
year before.40
When the validity of a constitutional amendment is to be considered,
Section 2 of Article 16 is not to be overlooked. This section provides: "If
two or more amendments shall be submitted at the same time, they shall be
submitted in such manner that the electors shall vote for or against each of
said amendments separately; and while an amendment or amendments which
shall have been agreed upon by one General Assembly shall be awaiting the
action of a succeeding General Assembly, or of the electors, no additional
amendment or amendments shall be proposed." Whether this section means
that no amendment or amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted
while another amendment or amendments are pending, or that no amendment
shall be submitted while another amendment to the same section is pending,
has not been settled by the Supreme Court. The question is not presented by
the Todd case, however, as the lawyer amendment, as were the other four
amendments, was submitted when no amendment or amendments at all were
pending, either in the General Assembly or for vote by the electors.
CARL L. CHATTIN.
RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Constitutionality of the Hit-and-Run Drivers' Act.
The defendant, while driving an automobile in Indianapolis, struck and hit
one John Batkin, who died from the injuries received. Defendant was then
indicted on the ground that he unlawfully and feloniously failed to stop his
automobile and render and offer assistance to Batkin; that he failed to report
the accident to any police officer, peace officer, or police station, and he failed
to give his name, address, and license number of his car. The indictment was
in harmony with the Hit-and-Run Drivers' Act, which in substance requires
a person to stop immediately after the accident and give his name, address,
and license number to the person injured or to the police. The defendant
filed a motion to quash the indictment, which was overruled. He was tried
and found guilty, sentenced to imprisonment for one year, and fined one
hundred dollars. He thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court. Some of
his contentions were that the act is in conflict with Section 14, Article 1, of
the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees immunity from double jeopardy
and self-crimination; that it violates the Thirteenth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution as authorizing involuntary servitude; and also that the act
is unconstitutional for the reason that it requires his services without just
compensation. Held, the act did not contravene the defendant's constitutional
rights.'
The old common-law maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, that no man
is bound to accuse himself of any crime, is founded in great principles of
constitutional right and was not only settled in early times in England but
was brought by our ancestors to America as part of their birthright.2 The
Constitution of the United States, as well as those of practically all of the
39 (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
40 Kettleborough, Constitution Making in Indiana, Vol. II, pp. 620-629.
I Ule v. State (1935), 194 N. E. 140 (Inc.).
2 Marshall v. Riley (1849), 7 Ga. 367.
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states, contain guaranties against self-crimination. Compulsion is the keynote
of the prohibition, and to render evidence inadmissible on the ground that
the defendant was compelled to produce it against himself, it must appear
that such compulsion was used as to rob him of volition in the matter. 3 But
whether the various compulsory acts themselves produce self-crimination is
a matter of some conjecture among the courts. There is a line of decisions
which holds that it is error to compel the defendant to submit to a comparison
of footprints,4 while on the other hand there are decisions to the contrary.5
Some courts do not compel the defendant to submit to an examination of his
person, or compel him to exhibit to the jury marks, scars, or other physical
deformities,0 while a few courts have been inclined to reach an opposite
result.7 The first line of cases proceed upon the theory that the constitu-
tional prohibition applies to acts as well as words. Hence, to compel a person
to exhibit himself for the sake of identification, or for any other purpose
which tends or may tend to aid the prosecution in securing a conviction, is
in direct conflict with his constitutional privilege. The fundamental concept
back of the privilege is to protect a person from being compelled to give
evidence that will directly criminate him or will furnish a link in a chain of
evidence that will produce the same result. Logic would seem to require that
the privilege be extended to protect the accused from compulsory acts as well
as from compulsory utterance to any fact by word or pen.
Though the act at bar was never before constitutionally tested by the
Indiana Supreme Court, other state courts have long before been confronted
with the identical problem. The overwhelming weight of authority supports
the present case.8 It is argued in some of the cases that to compel a driver
to identify himself after having injured another person is to compel such
driver to criminate himself. Every accident, of course, does not necessarily
mean that the driver has been guilty of some crime, but at the same time
many of the accidents do give rise to criminal offenses. So where the driver
has been guilty of culpable negligence, he may be subject to a prosecution of
manslaughter. The public prosecutor must prove as a prerequisite to a lawful
conviction the identity of the person prosecuted with the person causing the
injury. It is then urged that the identity of the driver furnishes a definite
link in the chain of evidence against him. This line of argument, though it
has technical merit, is untenable. As pointed out in the Ex parte Kneedler
case,9 the statute does not make the accident a crime. A criminal prosecution
for culpability in causing the accident must necessarily arise from some other
statute. It is true that the identity of the driver may furnish a defi-
nite link in a chain of evidence that may tend to convict him of reckless
3 Eaker v. State (1908), 4 Ga. A. 649, 62 S. E. 99.
4 Stokes v. State (1875), 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619; Blackwell v. State (1894), 67 Ga.
76, 44 Am. Rep. 717; People v. Mead (1883), 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95; State v.
Heigh (1902), 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935.
G State v. Thompson (1912), 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249; State v. Ah Chuey (1879),
14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530; State v. Johnson (1872), 67 N. C. 55; Pitts v. State
(1910), 60 Texas Cr. 524, 132 S. W. 801.
6 State v. Jones (1900), 153 Mo. 457, 55 S. W. 80; State v. Miller (1905), 71
N. J. Law 527, 60 A. 202; Davis v. State (1902), 131 Ala. 101, 31 So. 569; People
v. Mead (1883), 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95; Union Pacific Ry. v. Batsford (1890),
141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000.
7 State v. Johnson (1872), 67 N. C. 55; State v. Ah Chuey (1879), 14 Nev. 79,
33 Am. Rep. 530; Holt v. U. S. (1910), 218 U. S. 245, 31 S. Ct 2.
S Woods v. State (1916), 1,5 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129; State v. Razey (1929),
129 Kan. 328, 282 Pac. 755; Ex Parte Kneedler (1912), 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983;
People v. Rosenheimer (1913), 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530; People v. Diller (1914),
24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797; State v. Sterrin (1916), 78 N. H. 220, 98 Ati. 482;
Stalling v. State (1922), 92 Texas Crim. Rep. 354, 243 S. W. 990.
9 Ex Parte Kneedler (1912), 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983.
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driving, yet if this is to be taken as a valid objection, then to require the
driver to register his automobile and name before he can drive upon the
highway is also unconstitutional. The validity of the latter requirement is
beyond argument.
The legislature, in the exercise of its police power, may enact statutes
for the preservation of public safety, health or morals which may sometimes
impinge upon the liberty of individuals by restricting their uge of their
property or abridging their freedom in the conduct of their business. 10 The
courts in their discretion must balance the social interest that is attempted
to be protected by a statute against the delimitation of some personal or
property right. In a general way, it may be said that the state's police power
extends to all of the great public needs. It may be put forward in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare. Since motor vehicles have become a common means of travel upon
the highways, then certain restrictions in the use of the highway must become
paramount over many former private rights and privileges. It is to be
realized that a person's constitutional guaranty against self-crimination is a
privilege and not an absolute right. The defendant may exercise his privilege
or he may waive it. If he chooses to waive it and takes the witness stand in
his own behalf, he cannot thereafter reclaim the privilege. 1 ' The use of the
highways is a privilege and not a right. 1. It has been said that the legislature
may prohibit altogether the use of motor vehicles upon the highways or
streets of the state.13 The orthodox view that the state may grant upon
condition that which it might withhold is the keynote for the constitutionality
of the statute at bar. But whether the legislature has this power or not, it is
essential that a person, in the exercise of his privilege, must use the highway
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others. 14 Thus the state gives to a
person the privilege of using its highways which he is at liberty to accept or
reject. But having once accepted, he cannot be heard to object to conditions
which have been attached thereto. 15 The conditions attached to a privilege
are as important as the privilege itself, and to separate them by granting the
privilege devoid of the condition would be the twisting of legislative intent,
which the courts are not prone to do. If, then, the driver does furnish a link
in a chain of evidence against himself by giving his name, he has no grounds
for complaint. He has waived his privilege against self-crimination in this
respect, for he has chosen to use the highways. He has given up one privilege
in barter for another.
In grasping for legal loopholes, the defendant brought into play the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. It was pointed out that
to require the defendant to render assistance was to create involuntary
servitude and not as a punishment for a crime. Little need to be said on this
point. The principal case very ably brought out the fallacy in such an argu-
ment. The leading purpose of this amendment was to effect the abolition
of African slavery in the United States.'0 Thus the courts have given the
word "slavery," as used in the amendment, a philosophical meaning, and
have consistently held that it does not include such reasonable regulations as
10 Black, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. ed., page 482.
11 Brown v. Walker (1895), 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819; Greenl. Ev., para. 451.
12 Commonwealth v. Kingsbury (1908), 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848.
13 State v. Mayo (1909), 16 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295.
14 People v. Rosenheimer (1913), 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530.
15 State v. Corron (1905), 73 N. H. 434, 62 Atl. 1044; State v. Sterrin (1916), 78
N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482.
16 Civil Right Cases (1883), 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835; Butchers Benevolent Asso-
ciation v. Crescent City Livestock Landing, etc., Co. (1872), 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394.
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the state may impose upon individuals in order to establish decent social
control.17 It follows that the purpose of the amendment was not to destroy
the state by depriving it of essential powers.' s The requirement in the statute
is an important police regulation and the courts have not hesitated to recog-
nize it as such. The magnitude of the social interest on one side so com-
pletely outweighs the private rights involved, that the courts find no difficulty
whatever in overruling such a contention. And, as already pointed out, one
has only a privilege granted by the state to use the highway, and if he is to
exercise this privilege, he must acquiesce in the conditions attached thereto.
Article 1, Paragraph 21, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides
that "No man's particular services shall be demanded without just compen-
sation," is not a restraint upon the state's police power. In pointing this out,
the principal case cites the case of State v. Richcreek. 19 It is true that the
taking of private property or of personal service for a public use is an exer-
cise of eminent domain for which the state must pay compensation. But the
requirement at hand is not the exercise of the right of eminent domain; it is
the exercise of the state's police power. As such, no compensation is called
for, although the exercise of the latter power may injure or destroy a busi-
ness, decrease the value of property, impose inconvenience or loss upon
individuals, or subject them to economic restraint or burdens. 20
Regardless of the fact that the case at bar is the initial one in Indiana
on the points involved, it would have indeed been a rare phenomenon if the
court had reached a contrary result. In light of the many decisions on similar
cases which have been handed down by other courts, the issues in the present
case were perhaps dead before they were tried. L. E. B.
Constitutional Law--Due Process-The Known Use of Perjured Testi-
inony by the Prosecution Not an Orderly Course of Procedure. Petitioner
seeks an original writ of habeas corpus. He states that he is unlawfully
restrained of his liberty under a commitment pursuant to a conviction, in
February, 1917, of murder in the first degree and sentence of death, later
commuted to life imprisonment. Petitioner charges that the state holds him
in confinement without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The grounds of his
charge are that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony which
was knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities in order to obtain that
conviction, and also that these authorities deliberately suppressed evidence-
which would have impeached and refuted the testimony thus given against
him. He alleges that he could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence
have discovered, prior to the denial of his motion for a new trial and his
appeal to the state 'Supreme Court, the evidence which was subsequently
developed and which proved the testimony against him to have been per-
jured. Held, the known use of perjured testimony and suppression of testk-
mony which would refute the perjured testimony, by the prosecuting author-
ities of a state in a criminal trial, violates the constitutional guaranty that no
person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process
'7 Butler v. Perry (1916), 240 U. S. 328, 60 L. ed. 672.
Is Slaughter House Cases (1872), 16 Wall. 36; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.
S. 537.
19 State v. Richcreek (1906), 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085.
20 State v. Jacobson (1916), 80 Or. 648, 157 Pac. 1108; Fougera v. N. Y. (1917),
166 N. Y. S. 248, 178 App. Div. 824; Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training
School (1911), 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920.
